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Abstract Following the proposal of a new kind of selective structural real-
ism that uses as a basis the distinction between framework and interaction
theories, this work discusses relevant applications in fundamental physics. An
ontology for the different entities and properties of well-known theories is thus
consistently built. The case of classical field theories –including General Rel-
ativity as a classical theory of gravitation– is examined in detail, as well as
the implications of the classification scheme for issues of realism in Quan-
tum Mechanics. These applications also shed light on the different range of
applicability of the ontic and epistemic versions of structural realism.
Keywords Scientific Realism · Philosophy of Modern Physics · Theory
Classification
1 Introduction: Framework and Interaction Theories
It has recently been argued that a consistent version of selective realism should
take into account the ontological level of the difference between what have
been called interaction, as opposed to framework, theories. This classification
is a refinement proposed by Flores (1999) to the classical distinction made by
Einstein between principle and constructive theories (Einstein, 1919).
When I refer to theories I am mostly assuming a semantic view on the-
ory structure (e.g. Suppes, 2002; Van Fraassen, 1989); thus, physical theories
are identified as classes of mathematical models. More precisely, theories are
identified with abstract theory-structures (families of mathematical models),
standing in mapping relations to phenomena. For the scientific realist, the is-
sue is then to give a consistent description of this mapping between models
and phenomena that allows to consider the entities, properties, or laws in the
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theories to be elements of objective reality, even on the face of the historical
fact that theories have been superseded once and again. A strategy for this is
to be selective at the time of assigning ontological commitments to different
theories and pieces of theories (see Psillos, 2005). Such a take on scientific re-
alism, and how it applies to known theories, is the leading thread of this work.
This being said, the general notion of an interaction/framework division, which
is the basis of this version of selective realism, is compatible with all the most
known views on scientific theories, from the ‘received view’ of positivism (e.g.
Hempel, 1970), to more modern pragmatist views (e.g. Cartwright, 1999).
The newer classification scheme for theories proposed by Flores (1999) uses
a functional criterion: interaction theories are those that deal with the different
way that entities are observed to interact (or somehow affect each other) in the
world, whereas framework theories provide general constraints and common
regularities for (generally more than one) interaction theories. A rich exam-
ple of how this classification works can be studied at the level of Newtonian
mechanics: Newton’s three laws of motion give a regulative framework for the
study of any force law, and should be seen as the overarching or background
structure of classical mechanics. Conversely, specific force laws, such as the
law of universal gravitation, deal with the details of one particular type of
interaction, and work within this general framework. More modern examples
of the usefulness of the classification are the building blocks of what follows.
The crux of the argument (starting from Romero-Maltrana et al. (2018))
is that the ontological commitment that should be attached to the different
entities, laws, and properties within each of these two kinds of theories is in
principle very different, and has not been properly discussed in the literature,
which in my opinion sometimes leads to confusing metaphysical postures. This
has implications for the ontology of a series of well-known theories from fun-
damental physics, an exploration of which is the aim of the present article.
Let me introduce a quick restating of the different ontological commitments
that one can justify while taking as a basis the framework/interaction theory
distinction. The distinction is especially useful when performing a case by
case analysis of the ontological commitment due to entities, properties, and
laws belonging to a given theory. In following the ontological facet of the
framework/interaction classification, and always within the overarching theme
of adopting a selective scientific realism to deal with the pessimistic meta-
induction, different kinds of structural realism are seen to be consistent with
each type of theory.
The choice of structural realism (Worrall, 1989) as the preferred solution
for the problem of the relation between scientific realism and theory change
in science is spelled out in more detail elsewhere. The basic idea behind it is
that even though scientific theories (and in particular fundamental physical
theories) have been discarded and superseded throughout history, we can be
confident given previous examples that there is something within the structure
of present day theories that will be preserved in any future theory. In this way
one can explain why science enjoys such an undeniable empirical success, while
at the same time allowing for theory change.
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The version of structural realism first presented by Worrall (1989) came
to be called epistemic structural realism (ESR). It states that our ontological
commitment should be put not on the specific entities of scientific theories,
but on their being part of an interaction structure, given that entities have
shown to be less resilient to theory change. A more extreme version, known
as ontic structural realism (OSR) (Ladyman and Ross, 2007; French, 2014),
argues than in fact modern science proves that structure is effectively all there
is to reality. The exact meaning of this provocative phrase changes a bit from
author to author. Here I prefer the metaphysically consistent version exposed
by (Esfeld and Lam, 2008; Esfeld, 2013), where structural relations join ‘empty’
relata: entities without any intrinsic property, that serve only as nodes to the
web of relations.
A summary of my proposal would run like this: first, to follow the ideas of
ESR when speaking about entities in interaction theories, which presuppose
the existence of some real entity taking part in the relevant interaction. Con-
versely, the ‘empty’, only relational, entities of OSR provide a good match for
framework theories, which are based on general principles and can be seen as
purely structural in nature.
Besides this, general laws are more properly seen as the natural domain of
framework theories; and framework laws should take some kind of ontological
precedence over interaction laws. Looking for a more precise statement of
this idea I introduce the notion of the relative modal strength of a realist
position (details of which are presented elsewhere). The basic idea is that
framework theories, serving as general constraints to any and all interaction
theories embedded within, are seen as having a greater degree of necessity
in a modal scale, as compared with the regularities or laws stemming from
interaction theories. This is useful as well to understand the relative greater
rigidity of framework laws on times of theory change.
Lastly, I propose a division of properties by means of the local/global axis,
which I deem is more useful –within a structural approach– than the better
known intrinsic/relational division. With this I propose that local properties
are the natural domain of interaction theories, while global properties adjust
themselves better to framework theories. Accordingly, I propose a greater on-
tological commitment to global properties in framework theories, and to local
properties in interaction ones, by way of property translation if necessary (e.g.
symmetry principles to local conservation laws in interaction theories).
This general scheme of selective structural realism is as good as its ability
to deal with real-life scientific theories, as well as with the known history of
theory change. I believe that the explanatory power of this approach is indeed
greater than that of competing views, as can be seen in the examples from
fundamental physics below. The examples also show how the specifics of each
theory have to also be taken into account, on top of the previous considerations,
when taking ontological commitments.
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2 Classical Field Theory
Beyond the relatively clear-cut case of Newtonian mechanics as explored else-
where, it is interesting to study what these ideas imply in the case of field the-
ories in the classical context. The most relevant example would be Maxwell’s
electrodynamics, clearly a theory of the interaction type, studying a specific
type of interaction. It is interesting to note that the framework theory within
which Maxwell’s theory fits naturally is special relativity, even though the de-
velopment of this interaction theory predates Einstein’s work. In fact, were it
not for the fact that electrodynamics is incompatible with the framework of
classical mechanics, special relativity would not have had a reason to be devel-
oped at the turn of the twentieth century. As such, the framework/interaction
divide is ahistorical, in the sense that, in principle, a given framework can
be developed before, after, or at the same time as the interaction theories it
naturally embeds.
Being an interaction theory, and following the previous discussion, one
should choose a type of ESR with respect to the entities belonging to the
theory. Therein lays a roadblock, as far at it is not completely clear which
entities are to be taken as the fundamental entities for the theory. This problem
repeats itself in the case of more modern theories, as will be shown below. In
the particular case of Maxwell’s theory, there are are two natural candidates
for fundamental entities: (point) charges, and the electromagnetic field.
The standard textbook answer to this question would be that both charges
and fields are needed in classical electromagnetism, and that its ontology
should consider both. This received view notwithstanding, it is interesting
to explore the issue with a little more depth, as has been done recently e.g.
in Lazarovici (2016). Indeed, one could argue that the notion of a field is sec-
ondary, ontologically speaking, to the notion of a charged particle. In this view,
fields would be useful mathematical concoctions, describing the way charges
interact with each other, but having no intrinsic reality. This is in particular
compatible with the Feynman-Wheeler absorber theory for the electromagnetic
interaction (Wheeler and Feynman, 1949). Moreover, an ontology of both fields
and particles also has to deal with the unsolved issue of the self-interaction of
particles with the field they themselves generate, a problem that still lacks a
fully satisfactory solution within the classical context.
The usual justification for the reality of the electromagnetic field is related
to locality in special relativity. That is, as opposed to the case of the gravita-
tional field in Newtonian gravitation, the electromagnetic field is to be reified
because the interaction between charged particles is not instantaneous, but
must obey the principles of special relativity (that is, the framework). This
notion is contaminated by old ideas about the electromagnetic field as being
the vibration of some kind of material substance. If, as is the case today, we
think of fields either as substances in themselves or as properties of space-time
points, this notion of locality preservation loses some of its weight, and is not so
clear that it is to be preferred to the notion of unmediated action-at-a-distance
with a retarded interaction (mathematically described by the electromagnetic
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field), were it not for physicist’s historical averseness to this concept. As a
famous example, Newton himself wrote that
It is inconceivable that inanimate Matter should, without the Mediation
of something else, which is not material, operate upon, and affect other
matter without mutual Contact. . . That Gravity should be innate, in-
herent and essential to Matter, so that one body may act upon another
at a distance thro’ a Vacuum, without the Mediation of any thing else,
by and through which their Action and Force may be conveyed from
one to another, is to me so great an Absurdity that I believe no Man
who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty of thinking can
ever fall into it. (Newton, 1756)
In terms of the distinction interaction/framework, I argue that it makes
sense to reify (in the ESR sense) the entities that suffer from the correspond-
ing interaction effect. As the electromagnetic field itself does not have electric
charge, its electromagnetic interaction is justifiably seen as being of a sec-
ondary nature. This is easier to see in the relativistic notation of the theory,
which treats the electric and magnetic fields as two aspects of the same entity,
the field strength F (using the classical Maxwell’s notation electric and mag-
netic fields could be considered as independent substances which interact with
one another). In this way, one could argue for a view where charges would be
the fundamental entities of classical electromagnetism, with fields playing a
secondary, derivative role. This view add further weight to the already well
fundamented view of Lazarovici (2016).
There are, however, two separate senses in which one can consider Maxwell’s
theory. The first is as the theory of the classical electromagnetic interaction,
such as in the discussion up to this point; the second is as the simplest ex-
ample of a gauge theory, possessing an Abelian U(1) internal symmetry. In
this classical gauge theory, the symmetry only makes full sense in terms of
fields, and, as per the discussion above for interaction theories, this symmetry
property should be adjudicated to some localized real entity within the theory.
It could be argued that gauge symmetry is in an ultimate analysis strongly
associated with local charge conservation, but even this view can only be ex-
pressed in terms of fields or their potentials. In particular, the relation between
charge conservation and U(1) symmetry that can be observed using Noether’s
theorem presupposes the existence of dynamical fields (Schwarzbach, 2010).
In fact, Maxwell’s theory is a special case of more general theories in two
senses: first, electromagnetism is a special case of a Yang-Mills gauge theory.
It is important to notice that in non-Abelian Yang-Mills theories the fields
do carry their own (group) charge. As these are interaction theories, our cri-
teria for these entails ESR with respect to the Yang-Mills fields, and, in the
‘limit’ of an abelian gauge group, this would entail the reality of Maxwell’s
fields. Moreover, all these generalized theories are non-linear, as opposed to
Maxwell’s, and it is very unclear (and indeed unlikely) that a construction
similar to that of Wheeler-Feynman can be applied to these cases, in order to
make the fields disappear from the ontology.
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Secondly, electromagnetism is the classical limit of quantum electrodynam-
ics (QED). I will discuss the ontology quantum field theory in detail elsewhere,
but suffice it to say that even if the correct ontology for QED is one of quantum
particles instead of fields, the electromagnetic field has an associated particle,
the photon, which should also reasonably be considered as real. Notice that
QED, as opposed to classical electromagnetism, is a non-linear theory, as can
be easily seen by the fact that photons, although being neutral entities, can
interact with each other, and hence violate superposition, by means of virtual
particles. This non-linearity can be seen as the root of the QED solution of
the self-interaction issue, similar in spirit to the Born-Infeld solution for the
classical case: QED solves the self-interaction problem of particles with their
fields in terms of mass renormalization within the renormalization group (and
in an interesting turn of events, self interaction effects are considered in order
to reproduce the famous Lamb shift (Weinberg, 1995)).
There are some possible caveats to this reasoning. (i) QED and Yang-Mills
theories are extensions or variations of electromagnetism, and it could be the
case that the ontology to be taken in each case is completely independent. This
is of course possible, but one would like some sort of parsimony in assigning
ontological weight to theories, without such kind of abrupt changes of reifica-
tion. This is analogous to the well-known Bohmian argument to preserve an
ontology of particles in the classical-to-quantum transition. (ii) Within QED,
one could propose to reify only the fermionic particles, associated to matter,
as opposed to the bosonic particles such as the photon, commonly called ‘force
carriers’. Once more, this argument does not hold in the case of non-abelian
gauge Yang-Mills theories, of which QED is only a subsector in the standard
model of particle physics, in case one takes the (interaction theory) property
of charge to be connected with the entity ontology, as per the general discus-
sion above. On top of that, an exclusive fermion ontology is at odds with the
standard model mechanism of fermion mass generation: by means of inter-
action with the (electroweak) charged bosonic Higgs field. (iii) The classical
limit of Yang-Mills theories is not realized in the actual world, which may be
interpreted as a point against working with an ontology of these as classical
theories. However, the fact is that this absence from the classical world is rela-
tively well understood. First, most non-abelian gauge theories are expected to
show the phenomenon of quantum confinement, such as is the case for quantum
chromodynamics. Confinement does not allow for the macroscopic detectabil-
ity of properties associated with the fundamental charges, and these theories
are thus not expected to show at the classical macroscopic level. Secondly, in
cases where confinement does not play a role, such as in the electroweak sector
of the standard model, spontaneous symmetry breaking of the gauge symme-
try can make the associated interaction to be unaccessible at the macroscopic
level, such as is the case for the weak interaction in our actual world.
To conclude this example, classical electromagnetism, as an interaction
theory, can justifiably be considered both as a theory of point charges with
derivative (non reified) fields, but without a clear metaphysical continuity
to more modern theories; or like a theory of real point charges and fields
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(modulo the self-interaction issue, which should be seen as a quantum problem,
somewhat alike to the singularity within a black hole in general relativity). In
the latter case, arguably the most compatible with the structural realist answer
to the issue of theory change, the relevant real properties are electrical charges
and their fields as responsible of the gauge symmetry; while laws of e.g. charge
and energy conservation, are expected to hold within the framework laws of
special relativity, having to comply e.g. with the associated Lorentz invariance.
3 Special and General Relativity
Next, it is interesting to study the case of both special and general relativity,
which I argue are to be considered of the framework kind. Of course, the
philosophical interpretation of these theories is a research area in itself, and
only a very succinct discussion of these topics is given here, with an emphasis
on the ontological implications arising from the alleged framework character
of these theories.
The matter seems quite clear for special relativity: indeed, this theory is
one of the main examples in the original principle/constructive classification
by Einstein. The dual principles of relativity of physics, and constancy of the
speed of light, play the role of constraints on any possible physical process, with
the electromagnetic interaction as described by Maxwell’s equation being the
historical focus. From these postulates many un-intuitive consequences follow,
such as the relativity of simultaneity, and Lorentz contraction.
The constraints of special relativity can be expressed, as Minkowski found,
as being equivalent to a particular structure of physical space and time (and
therefore also of the causal relation). This space-time approach is also very
clear in its framework character, serving as a literal background for any phys-
ical interaction.
Taking a closer look, the only entities one encounters in special relativity
are the space-time points. As corresponds to a framework theory, I propose to
give them at most only a completely relational notion of reality, as beckons to
a moderate version of ontic structural realism, such as that proposed by Esfeld
and Lam (2008). In this view, space-time substantialism cannot be justified
from the principles of special relativity alone, although extra metaphysical
information could in principle be used to take this view.
As an aside, there is an interesting connection with classical field theories.
As described in the previous section, classical field theories are to be considered
interaction theories within the framework of special relativity. Following the
discussion above, it is a straightforward task to give an ontology for the fields
of classical field theories: as opposed to space-time points, fields are entities of
interacting theories, so a substantialism with respect to fields seems preferable
over seeing fields as intrinsic properties of what i have argued should be con-
sidered as ‘empty’ space-time points. Again, space-time substantialism is still
a valid metaphysical position, but cannot be justified by appeal to scientific
realism alone in this selective realism framework.
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The natural properties and relations belonging to special relativity are the
Lorentz invariants. In some sense all Lorentz invariant properties are global
properties as I defined above: this invariance is something that is associated
with the global transformations encoded in the Poincaré group (that is, trans-
lations, rotations, and boosts). It is interesting to note that already Lange
(2001) argues that only Lorentz invariants should be seen as ‘real’ in a rela-
tivistic theory, being the only observer independent quantities.
Regarding laws or processes in special relativity, any interaction law within
this framework has to follow the principles of Lorentz covariance. This strongly
restricts the modal space for all such theories, as will be discussed further
when considering quantum field theories in a forthcoming work. Of course,
the rigidity at the time of theory change of this constraint is greater than that
of any interaction theory. The theory change to general relativity (GR) is a
case in point, in that the principle of equivalence ensures that the Minkowski
structure of special relativity is preserved locally for every inertial observer,
which is in fact the way by which interaction theories are introduced to GR
(e.g. electromagnetism is translated from Minkowski to GR spacetime by the
change from ‘flat’ space-time derivatives to covariant derivatives in Maxwell’s
field equations).
Turning to the case of GR, again one can define the theory by two pos-
tulates: the principle of equivalence and the principle of general covariance.
Expressed in this way, it is clear that GR is a framework theory, constraining
what physical processes are possible in our universe. As in the case of special
relativity, the constraints of GR can be re-expressed in terms of a specific geo-
metric structure for space-time. Following GR, the universe is a differentiable
manifold, with the geometry of free-falling observers locally indistinguishable
from Minkowski space-time. Within this framework structure, specific inter-
action theories, such as electromagnetism, introduce the mass-energy that dy-
namically modifies the space-time geometry following Einstein’s field equations
(Wald, 2010).
GR could näıvely be considered as a theory of the gravitational interaction,
but the principle of equivalence does not allow for this. The insight by Einstein
is that the equality between inertial and gravitational mass in Newton’s theory
implies that in GR there is no such thing as a gravitational interaction, only
the effect of being within a non inertial frame of reference; that is, a geometric
effect. GR stands thus as a particularly interesting theory form the point of
view of the framework/interaction duality. In fact, GR can be seen as the first
step within Einstein’s effort to geometrize all of fundamental physics1. With
this I mean the following: what would seem to be the natural playground of an
interaction theory for the gravitational force was turned by Einstein, using the
1 Einstein himself might not have approved of this way of describing his program, see
Lehmkuhl (2014). There, it is argued that Einstein himself considered GR to be a unification
of gravity and inertia, and not a reduction of one into the other, and that his program was
to find a further unity with electromagnetism. In the end, the result of the program would
still be a framework theory (he would have called it a principle theory) where all of physics
stands.
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equivalence principle, in a theory of non-inertial reference frames, and general
covariance of physical laws: a framework theory. Later on, Einstein tried to
further generalize this approach to electrodynamics, with the idea of arriving
to a unified field theory which would have been a sort of framework ‘theory of
everything’.
This was also the ambition behind Wheeler’s programme of geometrody-
namics from the early sixties, which set out to geometrize away all interactions.
Geometrodynamics (Wheeler, 1962) then was planned as a full framework the-
ory of all of fundamental physics. Naturally, there are not any objects apart
from space-time points in geometrodynamics, and it is unclear what interaction
means when it is geometrized away, and what would be the ontological status
of a theory without any interaction. As is well known, neither Einstein’s nor
Wheeler’s efforts were successful. Much more can be said about the relation-
ship between this ‘geometrization’ approach and the framework/interaction
duality, but I leave further discussion of this for future work.
As before, the entities of a space-time theory such as GR are the space-time
points. Suiting its framework character, these are naturally ‘empty’ of any in-
trinsic reality (Esfeld and Lam, 2008). This is in agreement with Einstein’s
solution to the hole argument, and once more against space-time substan-
cialism. Again, this does not by itself disprove space-time substantialism, as
it could possibly be justified using metaphysical arguments from outside the
theory of GR.
As a side note, it is interesting to compare the framework character of
space-time theories with the neo-Kantian point of view of e.g. Friedman (2014).
In this vein, an argument can be built about all framework theories working
as a kind of a priori setting for the physics of interactions. The analogies are
strong, and to a certain point all structural views can be associated with some
kind of neo-Kantian view, but this leads beyond the scope of this work. I leave
open this line of inquiry for future investigations.
Finally, the discussion would be incomplete without mentioning that there
is also an approach, first developed by Feynman, that recovers the equations
of GR within a theory of a spin-2 field on a flat Minkowski space-time. This
field gives the basis for the notion of the ‘graviton’ particle responsible for
the gravitational interaction in some proposed theories of quantum gravity.
In this case, one deals with a regular field theory for gravity, and in partic-
ular, with an interaction instead of a framework theory. Indeed, the natural
framework for this spin-2 interaction theory of gravity is still special relativity.
Even though both approaches recover the same field equations, the difference
between the framework GR and the interaction spin-2 theory of gravity is of
course fundamental, and each serves as a very different starting point in the
search of a full theory of quantum gravity.
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4 Shape Dynamics
Another, perhaps less known example of a framework theory can be given in
what Barbour (2012) calls Shape Dynamics (SD). Shape dynamics represents
a modern, consistent take on Leibniz’s notions of a purely relational space.
Within SD, the relevant physical information about particle systems does not
rest on their positions with respect to a background space, and how they
change during an external independent time, but on their relative positions
and their change thereof, i.e. ignoring any space and time scale external to
those directly derived from the dynamics of matter itself.
It is worth noting that Barbour’s shape dynamics has been successfully
generalized as a theory of gravity that implements Mach’s principle, developed
with the goal to solve the problem of time in quantum gravity. Shape dynamics
is dynamically equivalent to the canonical formulation of general relativity (in
particular the ADM formalism, as shown by Gomes et al. (2011)). In more
detail: it is equivalent to GR if this latter is limited to space -time geometries
allowing for a 3 + 1 foliation (which is the case for all physically relevant GR
solutions). Given that this proposal is less well-known than GR, it is interesting
to dedicate some paragraphs to describe its most salient features.
The main constrain of a relationalist geometry is the absence of a fixed
unit of length. A moment of reflection allows one to visualize that, barring any
external length scale or absolute reference system, two configurations of points
showing the same overall shape would be indistinguishable from one another.
That is to say, for example, that for a configuration of three particles, all similar
triangles cannot be distinguished; therefore, these would count as identical
configurations. Alternatively stated, the shape made by the point particles is
what defines the state of the system. Notice though that SD includes as a
primitive fact the known dimensionality of space.
What is known as shape space is the key concept of the proposal. Consider
a configuration q = (q1, . . . , qN ) of N point particles and then translate all par-
ticles in the configuration in a given direction by the same amount: according
to SD, q and its translated configuration qT represent the very same physical
situation, and, thus, they are identical. Suppose now to rotate q: the new con-
figuration qR preserves the shape of the initial q, and consequently also q and
qR are equivalent. Moreover, suppose we take into account a configuration qS
which differs from q only by dilations (contractions or expansions, i.e. a scaling
transformation) preserving its shape. Also qS , according to SD, will count as
equivalent with respect to the initial configuration q.
Using a more technical jargon, in the case of a configuration of N identical
particles, shape space is constructed through a succession of identifications
starting from the 3N -dimensional Cartesian configuration space QN for the
configuration at hand. The first step to construct shape space consists in claim-
ing that all the configurations that are carried into each other by translations
t ∈ T , the group of 3 dimensional Euclidean translations, represent the same
shape and are not to be distinguished. Thus, T decomposes QN into its group
orbits, which are defined to be the points of the 3N − 3 dimensional quotient
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space T N := QN/T . This first quotienting to T N is straightforward. More
significant is the second, which involves the 3-dimensional rotation group R
in order to construct the 3N − 6 dimensional relative configuration space QN
:=QN/T R. Finally, one has to take into account the final quotienting by the
dilatation (scaling) group S, depending on one scale parameter, which leads
to the shape space QNShape :=QN/T RS of dimension 3N − 7 (Barbour and
Bertotti, 1982; Barbour, 2003, 2012). The groups T and R together form the
Euclidean group, while the inclusion of S yields the similarity group.
The whole construction formalizes the fundamental geometrical notions of
congruence and similarity. Two figures are congruent if they can be brought
to exact overlap by a combination of translations and rotations and similar
if dilatations are allowed as well. If we have a configuration q of N identical
particles in Euclidean space, q ∈ QN , we can ‘move it around’ with T or R
or ‘change its size’ with S, and the configuration would be always the same
according to shape dynamics.
Once in possession of shape space, the history of a given configuration is
then defined as a trajectory within it. Importantly, it is this evolution itself
which yields a notion of ‘passage of time’, or better stated, a natural notion
of duration. In the same way as there not being any external absolute ruler
to measure positions, there is no external clock beyond the dynamics of the
system. The easiest manner to visualize this notion in the classical case is by
finding the geodesic flow of shapes in shape space, in terms of the metric in-
herited from the original Euclidean space. It is immediate to notice that these
geodesics are parametrization invariant (exactly as in GR), with the natural
definition of time corresponding to the choice of parameter that makes New-
ton’s second law true (Barbour, 2012). As it has been shown in this reference,





2(E − V )
, (1)
where mi, xi represent the particles’ masses and (Euclidean) positions respec-
tively, whereas E and V are the classical total and potential energies. Notably,
the time interval depends on the position change of every particle in the uni-
verse. As Barbour (2012) states
This is the first example of the holism of relational dynamics: the time
that we take to flow locally everywhere is a distillation of all the changes
everywhere in the universe. Since everything in the universe interacts
with everything else, every difference must be taken into account to
obtain the exact measure of time. The universe is its own clock.
There is certainly holism at work, as the full many-particle shape and
its changes give the natural units of time and distance needed to interpret
properties which are traditionally associated to each individual particle. This
emergent notion of time is in line with Mach’s ideas. Indeed, in his book The
Science of Mechanics, Mach eloquently claimed:
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[. . . ] we must not forget that all things in the world are connected with
one another and depend on one another, and that we ourselves and all
our thoughts are also a part of nature. It is utterly beyond our power
to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is
an abstraction, at which we arrive by means of the change of things;
made because we are not restricted to any one definite measure, all
being interconnected (Mach, 1960).
Shape Dynamics (as an ongoing program) is very tantalising in that it
recovers the intuitions behind the Machian critique of Newtonian mechanics
in a way that makes it compatible with the corroborated predictions of GR
(Gomes et al., 2011) while at the same time allowing for some approximate
notion of simultaneity or of space as decoupled form time to be brought back
from the dustbin of theoretical physics. The theory would obviously serve as
a framework for interaction theories, a framework which would dispense with
non-relational surplus information. All interaction theories are by definition
relational, and SD stands as a promising framework for further developments
in physics, e.g. in the search for a quantum theory of gravity.
5 Quantum Mechanics
As a fourth application it is important to see what these ideas imply in the
case of quantum mechanics (QM). First, it should be relatively clear from
our characterization of theories that QM is to be considered a framework
theory. Indeed, it postulates constraints and properties that are expected to
be obeyed by any physical system. Examples of these postulates include the
Born rule (and more generally the fact that the outcomes of measurements
are in general probabilistic), and the Hilbert space structure valid for the
description quantum states. Within this general framework which constrains
the behaviour of any physical system one uses interaction theories to describe
specific systems, such as e.g. electromagnetism to describe atoms. The top-
down framework structure of QM can most easily be appreciated in the diverse
approaches aiming for an axiomatic (Moretti et al., 2018) or informational
theoretical (Clifton et al., 2003) expression of the theory.
Here it is important to emphasize what I understand is QM as a physical
theory. One of the first motivations for the development of the semantic view
on physical theories (Suppes, 2002) was ? demonstration that two radically
different quantum-mechanic formalisms, the matrix and the wavefunction for-
malisms, were describing the same theory. This did not seem compatible with
the at the moment dominating syntactic view on theory structure. Thus, QM is
a class of mathematical models all of which which include the above mentioned
characteristics (Hilbert space structure2, Born rule, etc). This is compounded
by the existence of many so-called interpretations of QM, theories that add
to the basic QM formalism in a variety of ways in order to solve (or dissolve)
2 Or more precisely an underlying C∗-algebra structure.
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some of the issues that the bare formalism posses, such as the well-known
measurement problem. What I contend here is that the framework character
of QM is shared among all these models and interpretations. Importantly, this
framework character should be independent of the specific interpretation given
to the quantum wavefunction, or of which of the many possible solutions to
the measurement problem is considered correct, if any.
However, the framework character view could be contested within some of
the interpretations of QM. This dissonance may be mainly caused by previ-
ous attempts to use Einstein’s distinction between constructive vs principle
theories to the case of QM. Indeed, this is one of the cases where the frame-
work/interaction divide is a clear improvement in clarity over the older view.
For my purposes here, the distinction depends on whether QM works by pro-
viding constraints to the physics of any interaction, as opposed to modelling
some particular interaction. For this it is useful to set apart for a moment
the collapse postulate. Doing so, it is clear that standard textbook QM (and
on reflection, any other interpretation before measurement happens) consists
of a certain set of constraints over what is physically possible: probabilities
instead of certainties about observables, Schrödinger evolution, etc. When in-
teractions are treated in QM (for example using the quantum Hamiltonian
operator) they are always interactions of some specific type, belonging to a
specific interaction theory, e.g. electrodynamics.
Turning now to the collapse (or lack of it) of the wavefunction, certain
interpretations could be seen to imply the existence of a new kind of purely
‘quantum interaction’, so that the framework character of QM could be chal-
lenged. Even within the standard von Neumann collapse postulate, the collapse
is assumed to happen due to certain interactions with macroscopic measure-
ment devices. However, in this (metaphysically unclear) standard case, such
an interaction is always considered to be one of the already known interactions
of the world: for example, the collapse of the electron wavefunction would be
due to the electromagnetic interaction with a conducting measurement device.
In the modern versions of Bohmian or Everettian interpretations there are no
such extra interactions, as everything is governed by the Hamiltonian of the
system and eventually that of the environment (these Hamiltonians usually
include interactions terms belonging to different interaction theories). Con-
versely, in some other interpretations, such as Penrose’s (Penrose, 2000), and
arguably also in the Montevideo interpretation (Gambini et al., 2011), this
extra interaction would be associated with quantum gravity effects.
The case of GRW collapse interpretations is different (e.g. Ghirardi et al.,
1986, 1995). Within some versions of these, there can be an argument that
there is a new, purely quantum interaction, responsible for the spontaneous
collapse of the quantum wavefunction. If GRW interpretations turn out to be
true, I would propose to divide the theory of QM into two different theories:
one constraining the physics of any possible interaction, which I would call QM,
and a second one, which might be called quantum self-dynamics, describing
this new type of purely quantum interaction behind collapse. This solution,
of separating the framework aspects from QM from the possible interacting
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aspects, would be also useful in the aforementioned cases where an interaction
quantum theory of gravity should be used to understand collapse: gravity
would be the necessary interaction theory.
To summarize, the top down character of QM, and the way it constraints
the possible states of affairs in the world, imply its being a framework theory.
Within the framework of QM one can study the quantum physics of specific
(usually microscopic) systems, such as atoms, molecules, crystals, etc. This
physics is described in terms of specific interaction theories, the most relevant
of which is electromagnetism considered at the (semi-)classical level. Thus, the
theory of the hydrogen atom sits within the framework of quantum mechanics,
and involves the electric and magnetic classical interactions, together with
classically known charges and masses for the proton and electron, as well as
the purely quantum mechanical concept of spin (itself a postulated property).
This being the case, the approach I propose implies adopting (at best) an
ontic form of structural realism for the entities in QM. The wavefunction in
particular should be considered as real only inasmuch as its relational prop-
erties are involved, such as being compatible with the superposition principle.
This does not necessarily mean that interpretations that are more strongly
realist with respect to the wavefunction are to be discarded, only that this re-
alism should be justified otherwise, not relying solely on the structure of QM.
On top of that, as corresponds to a framework, the probabilistic nature of QM
should be seen as very rigid with respect to theory change, and local quantum
properties such as spin should better be seen as consequences of corresponding
global properties, stemming from the postulates of the theory.
The case of spin is particularly interesting, because it is a purely rela-
tivistic effect appearing even at the level of non-relativistic QM due to its
experimental implications. This fact can only be justified a posteriori, within
a relativistic quantum theory, but the property of spin is a well-known conse-
quence of Lorentz invariance and the Wigner representation theorem (Wein-
berg, 1995). Thus, one deals here with a deficient framework theory, that of
Newtonian space-time, which forces on spin (and on related concepts, such as
the spin-statistics relation) the need to be assumed as an extra postulate in
non-relativistic QM in order to explain observations.
In two recent articles, Wallace (2016, 2018) also speaks of QM in terms
of it being a ‘framework’ theory. The precise meaning of his nomenclature is
not exactly the same as in this work, although there is a family resemblance
of sorts. Wallace argues that QM should be seen not as a single theory, but
as a class of theories, each related to a specific aspect of the quantum world:
e.g. atomic physics as opposed to quantum computing. In my view, there
is only one QM, but within this framework one can model the physics of
many particular systems, using specific interaction laws. In this, the different
approaches do not seem to differ in substance.
However, Wallace also uses this classification to declare that only the many-
world interpretation of QM is compatible with this framework character. First,
he argues that non-representational interpretations, such as Copenhagen’s, or
QBism, fail to go beyond “explanations of features of quantum theory in the
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abstract”, that is, to go beyond of the framework of QM, making “no use
of details of any particular quantum system”. In my alternative view, this
is a necessary consequence of the fact that QM is a framework theory; and
different arguments should be used instead to discard such interpretations.
Second, Wallace makes a distinction between what he calls ‘abstract’ QM,
and ‘quantum particle mechanics’, this last being QM expressed exclusively in
position space instead of within an abstract Hilbert space. He then argues that
Bohmian mechanics and GRW-type collapse interpretations cannot account
for the applications of QM which are not given in terms of quantum particle
mechanics, and therefore do not provide a good interpretation for the full QM
framework. This line of reasoning does not work, because (i) both Bohmian
mechanics and GRW theories have been shown to account for each known
case of a specific quantum system which is not in principle represented by
quantum particle mechanics (e.g. spin systems, or molecular systems (Norsen,
2014; Ghirardi et al., 1986)). (ii) Each interaction theory can and in fact
generally does add some formalism to the framework theory (e.g. fields in
classical electromagnetism), so the addition of non-spatial degrees of freedom
to the framework of QM does not necessarily mean that QM itself must be
non-spatial.
Indeed, as is argued by Esfeld (2013), assuming OSR for QM (as I propose
for framework theories) does not suffice to justify preference of any interpreta-
tion of QM over the rest, as there are a number of extra ‘for free’ metaphysical
assumptions that one can always make to accommodate any interpretation.
Thus, taking an OSR stance does not help in solving the measurement prob-
lem of QM. Moreover, the fact that QM is a framework theory indicates that
the solution to this indeterminacy with respect to interpretations should not
be sought within the QM formalism, but instead in the study of particular
interactions, with the hope of finding indications of incompatibilities with the
standard framework, allowing for an exit to the measurement problem. Promis-
ing areas to look for incompatibilities are quantum computing, and perhaps
relativistic QM and quantum gravity: the fact that the QM formalism is based
on Newton’s absolute time makes any time-related property of the theory (such
as wavefunction collapse) ill-fated. Otherwise, it is always possible to use meta-
physical arguments to choose the most promising interpretation of QM, but
these arguments are usually not seen as decisive.
Nonetheless, we can imagine a first-order analysis of the different ontolog-
ical status given to quantum entities by some of the most popular interpreta-
tions of QM. From the point of view of this work, it would seem ill-posed to try
and give an ultimate ontological weight to the entities in QM. Thus, the many
world interpretation, with its emphasis on the strict reality of the quantum
wavefunction of a physical system (and beyond that, the alleged reality of an
universal wavefunction describing the quantum state of all there is), seems to
assign ontological commitments much farther that what would be warranted
by a framework theory. Ontological commitments to entities should better
come from interaction theories, such as electromagnetism. This can arguably
be considered the case in Bohmian approaches, when the reality of point par-
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ticles is justified by by arguments outside of the characteristic of QM, and
involving theories of e.g. electromagnetism. Conversely, approaches that put
an emphasis on the instrumental role played by the wavefunction can and often
do forget to take into account the ultimate reality of the physical system under
study in each case: the existence of the electron as an entity participating in
the electromagnetic interaction is more than reasonably well established, no
matter what ontologic character is given to its quantum wavefunction.
Finally, as a very important aside, notice that some of the most relevant
motivations for the radical take on structural realism of OSR are in fact quan-
tum phenomena, such as entanglement and the quantum statistics of identical
particles (French and Redhead, 1988; Ladyman and Ross, 2007; French, 2014).
These phenomena follow from the postulates of the formalism, and the fact
that e.g. all electrons are indistinguishable depends on our specific theory of
electrons (QED), and not on QM as such. In any case, given that all the com-
pelling physical reasoning behind OSR is done using examples from framework
theories, it is easy to distrust the OSR position when dealing with interaction
theories, a posteriori confirming the choices made in part I of this series. In
fact, the other well-known justifications for OSR come from the argued lack
of primitive thisness of space-time points, and from mathematical properties
of fields within quantum field theory (QFT); and those entities also belong
to framework theories (the case of QFT is discussed in the next part of this
series, but suffice to say that its building blocks, namely SR and QM, are both
framework theories). Thus the framework vs interaction distinction allows us
to conceptually clarify the appeal and the limitations of OSR as justified from
fundamental physics.
In conclusion, the fact that QM is a framework theory tells us that (i)
its entities, such as the wavefunction, should be seen as having no intrinsic
reality. (ii) The usual justifications for OSR only apply in cases like this,
which is reasonable in retrospect. (iii) As such, the OSR position does not
yield a ‘natural’ interpretation for QM. (iv) The (postulated) existence of local
framework properties such as spin, together with the measurement problem,
speak of the ultimate awkwardness of this framework theory, which should
be superseded, at a minimum in accounting for a non-classical space-time
structure.
6 Conclusions
In this work, I explore the implications of a recently proposed version selective
scientific realism on a series of important fundamental physics theories. This
realism stands on the notion that there are of two kinds of (at least funda-
mental) scientific theories. On the one hand there are theories that serve as
frameworks, constraining what states of affairs or properties are possible in
the world, and on the other hand there are interaction theories, dealing with
the observed (and inferred) interactions between entities in the empirically ac-
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cessible world. This distinction, I contend, must have ontological implications,
and provides a useful guide for the selective realist.
The examples of fundamental physics presented here show that it is always
necessary to study the details of each framework or interaction theory when
building this type of selective scientific ontology of the world. Thus, specific
information coming from e.g. consistency conditions of the theory, or about
the observability of its entities or properties, may have to be used to decide
ontological commitment beyond only the theory type. An additional difficulty
is that, as a scientific realist, one inevitably has to do with non-final, non
well-defined, or otherwise incomplete theories. In these contexts, the selective
realist should follow, I think, the most accepted consensus stemming from the
scientific community.
The build up of this work leads to a notion of selective realism generically
giving more weight to the ontological status of entities belonging to interaction
theories, in particular in cases where the framework at hand can be considered
incomplete or in some other way unsatisfactory.
Regarding the specific theories discussed above, some (possibly controver-
sial) points deserve further emphasis. First, general relativity, although osten-
sibly a theory of the gravitational interaction, is in fact a framework theory.
This is due to the fact that the whole construction of GR dismisses gravity
as an interaction, turning it into a geometric effect instead. This is done by
the principle of equivalence, one of the two general principles upon which the
framework stands. Although highly non-trivial by itself, GR serves only as
a framework for other kinds of interactions such as the electromagnetic or
nuclear forces. This poses doubts on the ontological status of the relativistic
space-time, and, consistently with my treatment of framework entities, I argue
against a straightforward substantialist take on GR space-time.
Secondly, quantum mechanics is argued to also be a theory of the frame-
work type, providing constraints on what can be called the space of possible
physical processes. So, no matter what version or interpretation of QM one
uses, measurement results must be probabilistic, with probabilities given by
the Born rule, and physical states following a Hilbert space structure, etc,
with all these constraints acting upon any physical system. This QM frame-
work is occupied by diverse interaction theories, e.g. electromagnetism for the
purposes of studying atomic or molecular physics.
Third, and more generally, the question of which version of structural re-
alism, epistemic or ontic, is to be preferred, seems to be clearly connected to
the character of the physical theory in question. Indeed, proponents of OSR
justify their views using examples from modern physical theories which are,
without exception, framework theories: quantum mechanics, general relativity,
and quantum field theory (whose status will be discussed further in a forth-
coming work). I argue that the entities in these theories naturally don’t have
much intrinsic character (e.g. space-time points, individual entangled identical
particles, and so on) as a consequence of their being of the framework kind.
Conversely, entities belonging to interaction theories, such as point particles or
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charges, seem more difficult to discard from an ontology, given that the whole
point of the theory is to describe their behaviour.
These ideas themselves should serve as a framework of sorts for future dis-
cussions. In particular, I don’t pretend to have exhausted the ontological im-
plications of the framework/interaction theory dichotomy, nor all the ways this
classification can contribute for a solution of the pessimistic meta-induction.
Neither I think that the specific examples treated above are beyond revision;
although, once again, further investigation on these would demand in my view
a deeper comprehension of the characteristics of each case.
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